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The Significance and Impact of Price
Distortion in the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory after Halliburton II
Charles W. Murdock*
This past summer, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”), in
which the Court held that a defendant may establish lack of price
impact at the certification stage to establish a lack of reliance based
upon the fraud-on-the-market theory. This was the third decision in
three years dealing with the fraud-on-the-market approach to
establishing commonality with respect to reliance by plaintiffs on
management’s misrepresentations. In so doing, the Supreme Court
retained market efficiency as an element of the fraud-on-the-market
theory, but also reflected a broader and less restrictive approach to
market efficiency than had been adopted by some of the circuit courts.
By permitting defendants to establish a lack of price impact, which
plaintiffs will certainly challenge, this Article asserts that, because price
impact is linked to both loss causation and materiality, which previous
Supreme Court decisions have determined need not be established at
the certification stage, the Court has open the door to the litigation of
complicated, fact-based issues at the certification stage, rather than at a
trial on the merits where the litigation of such issues should properly
take place.
While there has not been much litigation as of yet applying
Halliburton II, courts thus far have held defendants to a substantial
burden in establishing a lack of price impact. Nonetheless, this Article
suggests that it is the misleading information injected into the market by
defendants upon which plaintiffs rely, not the market price, and that
certification should be a summary proceeding, leaving complicated and
complex issues of price impact, materiality, and loss causation to a trial
on the merits. Otherwise, the present approach raises as yet unresolved
issues as to issue preclusion, law of the case, and the Seventh
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INTRODUCTION
This Article was sparked by the panel discussions at the Institute for
Investor Protection Conference, “The New Landscape of Securities
Fraud Class Actions,” jointly sponsored by Loyola University Chicago
School of Law and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy (“the
Investor Protection Conference”). The conference program was
triggered by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Halliburton v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”).1
One would think that, after three Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the fraud-on-the-market theory in the past three years,2 the law in
this area would be effectively settled. Unfortunately, to the extent that
the law is “settled,” it is been settled in a very unsatisfactory manner.
Briefly stated, the Supreme Court retained the fraud-on-the-market
theory as a vehicle to establish reliance in securities class actions, much
to the chagrin of Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia.3 But, in so doing,
the Court also retained the notion that plaintiffs rely upon the market
price in an efficient market as the basis for establishing reliance. The
nuance that the Court added was that defendants, at the certification
stage, could introduce evidence as to the lack of price impact.4 The
previous Supreme Court decisions had held that plaintiffs need not
establish loss causation at the class-certification stage,5 and that they
also need not prove materiality at this stage.6

1. 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. Id.; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1203 (2013); Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
3. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
4. Id.
5. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2179.
6. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1203.
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As I have discussed in another article,7 the same evidence may
establish all three of these factors: loss causation, materiality, and price
impact. These are all fact-intensive questions that should be decided
after a trial on the merits, not in a summary proceeding to determine
class certification. Consequently, because price is the result of
misleading information, I have argued that it is more logical, from a
normative standpoint, to presume that a plaintiff relies on the
misleading information.8 Thus, all that should need to be established at
class certification is that defendants interjected material misleading
information into the market. At this point, materiality would be an
objective element, namely, a question of whether this information was
the sort of information upon which a reasonable investor would be
expected to rely.
The Supreme Court has continued us on the track of focusing on
price and whether the questioned information was inserted into an
efficient market, whatever that now means. This perpetuates the role of
federal courts in determining whether or not a market is efficient, a
question that arguably is incapable of answer because it assumes that
market efficiency is a binary question—yes or no—when, in actuality,
there are degrees of market efficiency.9 The majority opinion by Justice
Roberts is somewhat paradoxical because Justice Roberts recognized
that market efficiency is not a binary question.10 Moreover, he seemed
to agree with the proposition that the speed with which information is
impounded into any market is a function of the complexity of the
information, the manner and timing of the distribution of the
information, and other factors11: “[Basic, Inc. v. Levinson did not] adopt
any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available
information is reflected in market price.”12
This Article briefly reviews in Part II the concept of market
efficiency after Justice Roberts’ opinion in Halliburton II. In Part II, it
explores the law of the case and issue-preclusion ramifications of
permitting defendants, in a mini-trial, to establish a lack of price impact
7. Charles W. Murdock, Halliburton, Basic and Fraud on the Market: The Need for a New
Paradigm, 60 VILLANOVA L. REV. 202 (2015).
8. Id.
9. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 897–98 (1992).
10. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2414 (2014).
11. Murdock, supra note 7, at 237–38.
12. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 248 n.28
(1988)).
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to rebut the presumption of reliance. Part III looks at two models as to
how price distortion can occur and argues that, with respect to
confirmatory statements, the relevant price impact occurs upon the
corrective disclosure. Finally, Part IV reviews the significant cases
after Halliburton II to examine how they handled the issue of
defendants’ negating price impact. The conclusion asserts that the
present approach to establishing reliance is wasteful and inefficient.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
As indicated in the introduction, the recent decision in Halliburton II
should provoke a re-examination of the concept of market efficiency.
While Justice Roberts eschewed relying upon the economists’ view as
to whether it is possible for an individual investor to “beat the market”
as the determinant for an efficient market, the opinion provided little
guidance as to what the proper test would be. Justice Roberts implicitly
recognized that Nobel Prize-winning economists have taken opposite
views on whether markets are efficient.13 In so doing, he stated:
Even the foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis
acknowledge that public information generally affects stock prices.
See, e.g., Shiller, We’ll Share the Honors, and Agree to Disagree . . .
(“Of course, prices reflect available information”). Halliburton also
conceded as much in its reply brief and at oral argument. See Reply
Brief 13 (“market prices generally respond to new, material
information”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Debates about the precise degree to
which stock prices accurately reflect public information are thus
largely beside the point. “That the . . . price [of a stock] may be
inaccurate does not detract from the fact that false statements affect it,
and cause loss,” which is “all that Basic requires.”14

Justice Roberts also stated that Basic, Inc. v. Levinson “based the
[fraud-on-the-market] presumption on the fairly modest premise that
‘market professionals generally consider most publicly announced
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market
prices,’”15 and that “academic debates discussed by Halliburton have
not refuted the modest premise underlying the presumption of
reliance.”16 He also noted that, in adopting the fraud-on-the-market
theory, that Basic did not adopt “any particular theory of how quickly

13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Robert J. Shiller, We’ll Share the Honors, and Agree to Disagree, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, at BU6).
15. Id. (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24).
16. Id.
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and completely publicly available information is reflected in market
price.”17
What conclusion can we draw from the foregoing? This is a pretty
low threshold for determining market efficiency—a far cry from the
incredibly narrow and restrictive view taken by what is generally
considered the leading case on determining market efficiency: In re
PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation.18
Justice Roberts, in asserting that the fraud-on-the-market presumption
is actually two presumptions, stated that the plaintiff is entitled to her
presumption that the misrepresentation affected the stock price if the
plaintiff can show that the misrepresentations were public and material
and that the stock “traded in a generally efficient market.”19 He
followed this assertion by stating that “[b]ecause market efficiency is
not a yes-or-no proposition, a public, material misrepresentation might
not affect a stock’s price even in a generally efficient market.”20 The
corollary of this statement is that a public, material misrepresentation
might affect the stock’s price even in a generally inefficient market.
Consider the foregoing now in the context of events studies. To
support the majority holding that a defendant should be able to
demonstrate lack of price impact to defeat the fraud-on-the-market
presumption, Justice Roberts used the following hypothetical:
Suppose a defendant at the certification stage submits an event study
looking at the impact on the price of its stock from six discrete events,
in an effort to refute the plaintiffs’ claim of general market efficiency.
All agree the defendant may do this. Suppose one of the six events is
the specific misrepresentation asserted by the plaintiffs. All agree that
this too is perfectly acceptable. Now suppose the district court
determines that, despite the defendant’s study, the plaintiff has carried
its burden to prove market efficiency, but that the evidence shows no
price impact with respect to the specific misrepresentation challenged
in the suit. The evidence at the certification stage thus shows an
efficient market, on which the alleged misrepresentation had no price
impact. And yet under EPJ Fund’s view, the plaintiffs’ action should
be certified and proceed as a class action (with all that entails), even
though the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply and common
reliance thus cannot be presumed.21

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 2410 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28).
In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2005).
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414.
Id.
Id. at 2415.
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Justice Roberts asserted that the foregoing hypothetical reflects an
efficient market, even though it may only have been “efficient” in five
of six instances. The failure of the misrepresentation to move the
markets may have been because the misrepresentation was not material.
But it could also have been because the market was not efficient. What
if there was price impact in only four of six instances? Or three of six
instances? At what point would a market be considered “generally
efficient”?
This comes back to the question of why we litigate market efficiency
at all. Paradoxically, while Justice Roberts recognized that market
efficiency is not a “yes or no” question, “yes or no” is exactly what a
trial court must determine, so long as the focus is upon market
efficiency.
Consider another twist to Justice Roberts’ hypothetical: What if the
converse of his hypothetical were true, namely, there was no price
impact in five of the events studies but there was a significant price
impact in the sixth study that measured the price impact resulting from
misrepresentations being litigated? Here we would have a situation in
which the market would probably not be considered even “generally
efficient”; yet, the misrepresentation challenged by plaintiff clearly
moved the market. This is not an outlandish twist on Justice Roberts’
hypothetical. Consider the PolyMedica litigation in which the district
court,22 on remand from the First Circuit,23 determined that the market
was not efficient, notwithstanding the following price movements: a
49.54% decline on reports of consumer complaints to government
investigators; a 42.65% rise on PolyMedica’s response that those
reports were rumors and that it had not been contacted by any
government agency; a 29.52% decline on the announcement that shares
would no longer be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”);
a 32.17% decline on a report that PolyMedica may be indicted for
Medicare and investor fraud; a 17.65% decline on the announcement by
the company that the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida
was conducting an investigation into one of its units.
Unfortunately, the district court “bought” the testimony of
defendant’s expert who asserted that, within a 160 day period, there
were somewhere between 23 and 59 news days where the movement of
the market was not substantially different from a non-news day.24

22. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006).
23. In re PolyMedica Corp., 432 F.3d at 3.
24. In re PolyMedica Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d at 269–70.
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Consequently, the court concluded that the market was not efficient.25
But apparently, there was no testimony by the defendant’s expert as to
the significance of the “news” on the so-called news days. It is unlikely
that, on 23 to 59 so-called news days, there would have been disclosures
as dramatic as the allegations of Medicare fraud, denial of listing by the
NYSE, or a possible criminal indictment.
The foregoing should illustrate the folly of litigating market
efficiency as opposed to price impact. If the misrepresentation moved
the market, and if a plaintiff bought at a price that was affected by the
misrepresentation and later sold at a lower price once the truth was
revealed, has the plaintiff not been defrauded by the misrepresentation?
A fraud-on-the-market “purist” might respond that each plaintiff during
the period has been defrauded, but that there was no common reliance
and therefore no certifiable class action. This is basically the approach
of Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion. But this means the end of
securities litigation for the numerous plaintiffs whose loss is not
sufficient to warrant the hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation
expenses that are typically involved in securities litigation.26
While, as Justice Roberts asserts, it would be “bizarre”27 if a plaintiff
could have a class certified when the misrepresentation challenged by
the plaintiff had no market impact, it would be just as bizarre if a class
were not certified when the plaintiff demonstrated that the
misrepresentation caused a price impact, irrespective of the issue of how
“efficient” the market is in other circumstances. While the efficient
market hypothesis argues that an efficient market would be fooled by
any and all instances of fraud, such expansive evidence “is unnecessary
to demonstrate that the market was fooled by a particular statement.”28
This was very cogently argued over two decades ago:
Why should we, however, limit the presumption to traders in efficient
organized markets? The efficient market hypothesis cannot take credit
for the insight that information affects prices. As Justice Blackmun
acknowledged, an organizing principle of securities regulation since
its inception is that misinformation distorts the prices of stocks, small
as well as large—albeit sometimes more slowly and imprecisely with
25. Id. at 270, 278.
26. This is why I have argued that investors generally rely upon the integrity of the
information that management inserts into the marketplace.
27. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2415 (2014).
28. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13–317), 2014 WL 60721,
at *8.
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respect to the former. A buyer of a small over-the-counter stock no
doubt holds the same expectation of the absence of fraud (otherwise
why would she roll the dice, to repeat Justice Blackmun’s rhetorical
question), and does not act in an appreciably more unreasonable
fashion in so doing. In this light, discriminating between investors in
small and large companies makes no conceptual sense. The only
important question is whether the price was distorted. Given the wellacknowledged practical and conceptual difficulties of determining
what is or is not a truly efficient market—various conundra that all
stem from treating efficiency as a yes/no question rather than one that
varies as a matter of degree depending on the type of issuer and the
type of information—there are good reasons to want to avoid this sort
of threshold inquiry. Yet Basic seems to insist on it.29

While Basic may seem to insist upon it, the logic of Justice Roberts’
opinion in Halliburton II arguably does not.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LITIGATING PRICE
DISTORTION FROM A LAW OF THE CASE OR
ISSUE PRECLUSION PERSPECTIVE
From another perspective, I would argue that a defendant, seeking to
take advantage of the “benefit” afforded by the decision in Halliburton
II should proceed with caution and be aware of the adage “be careful
what you ask for, you just might get it!” Suppose a defendant seeks to
show the lack of price impact and fails. While this does not mean, as a
corollary, that the plaintiff can now demonstrate the existence of price
impact, practically speaking, the plaintiff is now in a much better
position, as the court has determined that the defendant’s argument is
dubious.
More importantly, once the defendant seeks to produce evidence
demonstrating a lack of price distortion, the plaintiff will certainly
produce evidence demonstrating the existence of price distortion.30 In
connection with the class-certification process, Justice Roberts,
speaking for the majority, clearly envisions a mini-trial.31 In rebutting
29. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 897–98.
30. Notwithstanding this assertion, the plaintiff, in Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food
Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV 10-J-2847-S, 2014 WL 6661918, at *8 (N.D.
Ala. Nov. 19, 2014), did not submit its own event study. See infra note 101 and accompanying
text (discussing a plaintiff’s intent to refute the defendant’s misleading statements and produce
evidence of price distortion).
31. This assertion was also rejected by the Alabama District Court in Regions, where the court
stated: “[s]urely the Supreme Court in Halliburton II did not intend to turn the class certification
stage of securities litigation into a trial on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.” Regions, 2014 WL
6661918, at *10. Only time will tell which assertion is correct.
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the plaintiff’s argument that price distortion, like materiality, need not
be proved at the class-certification stage, Justice Roberts stated that “the
other Basic prerequisites must still be proved at the class certification
stage.”32 He then distinguished price distortion from materiality as
follows:
Price impact is different. The fact that a misrepresentation “was
reflected in the market price at the time of [the] transaction”—that it
had price impact—is “Basic’s fundamental premise.” It thus has
everything to do with the issue of predominance at the class
certification stage. That is why, if reliance is to be shown through the
Basic presumption, the publicity and market efficiency prerequisites
must be proved before class certification. Without proof of those
prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market theory underlying the
presumption completely collapses, rendering class certification
inappropriate.33

By litigating price distortion at the class-certification stage, the
distinction that some courts have drawn between the scope of discovery
prior to class certification and the scope of discovery in connection with
the trial on the merits becomes meaningless. Price distortion is
inextricably intertwined with materiality and loss causation.34 Thus, an
attempt to limit discovery at class certification would be akin to splitting
hairs. As Judge Shira A. Scheindlin pointed out at the conference: “We
are now litigating whether or not there is price impact and guess who is
deciding that question? It’s the judge! It’s a three-day ‘hearing’ with
witnesses, with exhibits . . . .”35
Consequently, when the defendant puts price distortion at issue, we
now have a mini-trial in which evidence is adduced and full discovery
should be available. And the judge must make a decision that there
either is price distortion or that there is not price distortion. This then
raises the further issue of issue preclusion,36 or at least the law of the
case doctrine.37 Because this decision is made in the context of class
32. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (emphasis added).
33. Id. (citing Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179,
2186 (2011)). Amgen and Halliburton II, taken together, mean that materiality, although an
element of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which establishes reliance, need not be established at
the certification stage.
34. Murdock, supra note 7, at 245.
35. Judge Shira A. Sheindlin, Random Thoughts of a Federal District Judge, 46 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 453, 455 (2015).
36. See 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.01, ¶ 2 (3d ed.) (“Generally,
the doctrine of issue preclusion will prevent a party from relitigating an issue that the party has
already litigated and lost . . . .”).
37. See id. § 134.24 (“Once an appeal is taken and an issue is decided, that decision becomes
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certification, the decision is appealable.
Issue preclusion provides that, once a factual issue has been
determined in a proceeding between two parties, that issue may not be
relitigated. Thus, if at a contested, evidentiary hearing at which
discovery was available, there is a determination of either price impact
or no price impact, that issue should be resolved for the balance of the
litigation, whether by issue preclusion or the law of the case.
Otherwise, a contested issue, which is both critical and which involves
substantial cost in expert testimony and judicial involvement, will be
relitigated. This clearly is not consonant with a system of judicial
economy.
There are two circuit court decisions that bear on this question of
whether the resolution of a matter at a certification hearing can have
subsequent preclusive effect. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v.
Flowserve Corp.38 rejected the preclusive effect from a certification
proceeding, whereas In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products
Liability Litigation39 applied preclusion arising from a certification
determination.
Flowserve dealt with the issue of whether a determination at the
class-certification stage that found the lack of loss causation intruded
upon the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
matters.40 The Fifth Circuit had previously held that “loss causation [as
an issue of predominance] must be established at the class certification
stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence,”41 a position
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in Halliburton I.42 In
Flowserve, the plaintiff argued that a determination of loss causation at
the certification stage would have “‘the potential for intruding on
plaintiffs’ [Seventh Amendment] right to a jury trial,’”43 as the issue of

the law of the case for that issue . . . .”); see also 1 B J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ¶¶ 0.404(1) (Matthew Bender 2d ed.) (stating that when a court states a rule of law in a
given case, the law of the case doctrine generally requires the court to adhere to that rule
throughout the proceedings).
38. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 233 (5th Cir. 2009).
39. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 765–69 (7th Cir.
2003).
40. Alaska, 572 F.3d at 228.
41. Oscar Private Equity Investors v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir.
2007).
42. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–86
(2011). While loss causation cannot be litigated at the certification stage, under Halliburton II,
defendant can litigate the related issue of price impact, to which plaintiff most likely will respond.
43. Alaska, 572 F.3d at 228.
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loss causation should be presented to the jury at the merits stage. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, stating:
This argument fails because it conflates the issue of loss causation for
purposes of establishing predominance under Rule 23 with the issue of
loss causation on the merits. “In determining the propriety of a class
action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated
a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the
requirements of Rule 23 are met.”44

While it is true that the certification decision is not concerned with
whether or not the plaintiff will prevail on the merits,45 what is being
considered in connection with price impact is not claim preclusion, but
rather issue preclusion. On this, and other issues to be discussed later,46
the Flowserve opinion does not manifest a very sophisticated grasp of
securities litigation.
It is sophistry to say that a determination with respect to price impact
at the certification stage involves considerations different from those to
be determined at the merits stage. By moving the certification issue
from a summary proceeding to a mini-trial, involving a contested
hearing and a judicial finding, the issue of price impact is ripe for claim
preclusion. Because price impact is relevant both to determinations
regarding materiality and determinations regarding loss causation, it can
be expected that, should price impact be put in issue at the certification
stage, it will be highly contested. While the Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 23 state that a “determination once made can be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development
of the facts, the original determination appears unsound,”47 if an issue is
fully litigated at the certification stage, judicial economy should dictate
that it should not be relitigated at the merits stage.
On the other hand, Bridgestone recognized the applicability of
preclusion arising from a class-certification determination.48 The
Seventh Circuit had previously held in this litigation that the district

44. Id. at 229 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974)).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (“Although an evaluation of the
probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid
of the certification decision often includes information required to identify the nature of the issues
that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled
discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision
on an informed basis.”).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 60–97 (discussing the court’s approach in Flowserve).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95, 104 (1966).
48. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767
(7th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
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court had abused its discretion by certifying nationwide classes covering
multiple models of Ford vehicles and Firestone tires.49 The defendants
then sought an injunction forbidding any state court to entertain any
class action of any kind with respect to the alleged defective products.50
The Seventh Circuit held that “the only classes that had been certified
had national scope, and the only judgment that could be protected or
effectuated is one concerning such classes.”51 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the “district court had not certified, and in our opinion thus
did not address, any statewide class.”52 The court stated that “[w]hat
we did hold is that a class covering owners in every state may not be
certified over the defendants opposition,” and this holding was given
preclusive effect.53
While it could be argued that the preclusive effect enforced by the
Seventh Circuit involved “parallel” determinations, namely, that it
applied to subsequent certification decisions, whereas giving preclusive
effect to a price impact determination at the certification stage involves
a “series” determination, i.e., a subsequent determination in the same
litigation, both involved judicial economy and that a decision, once
made, should not be relitigated.
III. WHEN AND HOW IS PRICE DISTORTION MEASURED
There are two basic paradigms involving fraudulent
misrepresentations. The first is illustrated by the graph below:

This involves a situation where there is a relatively stable price and
the management of the issuer makes a fraudulent statement that,
generally, is aimed at raising the price of the issuer stock. This is a so49. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018–21 (7th
Cir. 2002).
50. In re Bridgestone, 333 F.2d at 765.
51. Id. at 766.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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called “good news” situation.54 The market responds to the positive
statement, the price increases, and basically holds for a period of time.
Then the truth is disclosed and the price drops. Here, there is price
impact both at the time of the misstatement and at the time of the
truthful correction.
While the foregoing situation does exist,55 another, and possibly
more typical, situation arises when there has been a series of positive
developments and then an unanticipated problem occurs. Rather than
acknowledging the problem, management continues to make positive
statements that are designed, not necessarily to increase the price of the
stock, but to retard a decline.56 This is illustrated by the graph below:

Clearly, there may be no price movement as a result of the
misrepresentations but, as a sophisticated analysis would appreciate,
54. Paradoxically, Basic involved a “bad news” situation, namely, management denied the
existence of takeover discussions, which had the effect of arresting an increase in price or
possibly causing a drop in price. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226–28 (1988).
55. In Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical Partners Inc., the price of the stock rose
approximately 40% as a result of the misrepresentation on August 27, 2013 ($1.42 to $2.01) and
then dropped about 40% after the truth was revealed on October 18, 2013 ($2.61 to $1.52).
Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 662 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
56. For example, in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, the company had
reported a 45% revenue growth for the preceding fiscal year and had projected similar growth for
the current year. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
Revenue growth for the first quarter was only 33% and, to counter a feared drop in the price of
the company’s stock, management made a series of announcements over a three-month period
that the first-quarter results for outliers and that the company would achieve its projected growth.
Id. at 981. In fact, the company had been experiencing problems in its supply chain and with that
sales-force. Id. While the misleading statements temporarily supported the price of the
company’s stock, when the company announced disappointing second-quarter results, the price of
the stock dropped to about 50%. Id. at 982. Similarly, in Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs Inc.,
management engaged in channel stuffing, and issued denials that there were potential revenue
problems, in order to support the price of the stock. Makor Issues & Rights, LTD. v. Tellabs Inc.,
437 F.3d 588, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded to Makor Issues & Rights, LTD. v.
Tellabs Inc., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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there is clearly price distortion because, if the truth were told, the price
would decline as opposed to remaining stable.
The Seventh Circuit dealt with this issue in Schleicher v. Wendt.57
Canseco’s management had made misleading positive statements during
the course of 2001 and 2002 as Canseco stock was doing poorly,
apparently seeking to retard the price decline. Canseco eventually filed
for bankruptcy in May 2010. The defendant’s argument apparently was
that the price of the stock was dropping irrespective of the
misrepresentations. In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit
stated:
That Canseco stock was falling during the class period is irrelevant;
fraud could have affected the speed of the fall. If a firm says that it
lost $100 million, when it actually lost $200 million—and analysts
had expected it to announce that it lost only $50 million—then the
announcement will cause a stock’s price to fall. But the fall won’t be
as much as the truth would have produced. People buy the stock after
the announcement, and before the truth comes out, pay too much; they
will lose money when the rest of the bad news emerges. This is no
different in principle from a firm’s announcement of a $200 million
profit, when the truth is $100 million; only the signs on the numbers
differ.58

While Judge Easterbrook’s wisdom should be evident, not all courts
understand this basic operation of the market. Consider the situation in
Flowserve59—previously discussed in connection with issue
preclusion.60 The issue discussed by the court dealt with loss causation;
however, the flaw in the court’s analysis is equally applicable to price
distortion analysis.
Flowserve reported earnings of $13.2 million for fiscal year (“FY”)
2000, when true earnings were $5.4 million.61 An April 24, 2001,
announcement reported positive first-quarter earnings, which overstated
earnings and understated costs, and the stock price increased 8%.62 On
July 24, 2001, the company released inflated earnings again, but
reduced its 2001 earnings guidance, causing the stock to drop 10.8% on
the day of the release, but rebounding by 7.7% the next day.63 On
57. Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010).
58. Id. at 684.
59. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 233 (5th Cir. 2009).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 40–47 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s approach to issue
preclusion).
61. Alaska, 572 F.3d at 225.
62. Id. at 225–26.
63. Id. at 226.
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October 22, 2001, the company again released inaccurate and overstated
third-quarter results and the stock price rose 6.8%.64 According to the
plaintiff, Flowserve also engaged in fraud when it knowingly released
overly optimistic FY 2002 earnings guidance on October 22.65 The
company again misstated its fourth-quarter results on February 4,
2002.66
In July 2002, Flowserve revised its FY 2002 guidance downward,
and the stock declined 37.4%.67 It declined another 38.3% after the
guidance was reserved downward again in September.68 On February
3, 2004, the company announced that it would downwardly restate
earnings for the period 2000–2003 by $11 million.69 No statistically
significant decline in the price of its stock occurred after this
disclosure.70 Eventually the company restated its earnings downward
by almost $60 million.71
In analyzing the foregoing facts, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
defendant’s argument that the “plaintiff must show a ‘fact-for-fact’
disclosure of information that fully corrected prior misstatements.”72 If
this is what the plaintiff would need to prove to establish loss causation,
there would be no loss causation, as the only fact-for-fact disclosure
was in connection with the restatement and no statistically significant
drop in the price of the stock occurred at that point. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit required that “this disclosed information must reflect part of the
‘relevant truth’—the truth obscured by the fraudulent statements.”73 In
the abstract, it would be difficult to quarrel with the statement. But the
relevant question is: What does it mean and how is it proved?
There were two different types of misleading statements involved in
the case. One group related to the disclosure of inflated earnings, the
second group related to the projections involved in earnings guidance.
The Fifth Circuit focused upon the latter, because the former would not
be actionable under the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in its earlier
case of Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc.74
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–32; Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 2004).
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In Greenberg, the plaintiffs alleged that the reported earnings for the
first quarter of FY 2000 and detailed analysts’ earnings estimates for the
second quarter were inflated.75 The plaintiffs also alleged that the thirdquarter earnings were inflated.76 The company had issued a press
release subsequent to the disclosure of the third-quarter earnings that
had predicted a significant revenue shortfall for the third-quarter.77 The
Fifth Circuit held that there was no relationship between the first and
second quarter misstatements and a subsequent release because “[t]he
release [did] not report any concern that first and second quarter
earnings [were] incorrect.”78 Rather, “[it] ma[de] no reference at all to
[the] first and second fiscal quarters.”79
This is both an unduly restrictive and a naïve approach to loss
causation and, by implication, price distortion. A significant revenue
shortfall for the third quarter could well be indicative of financial
manipulation in the first and second quarters, particularly if channel
stuffing were involved. As I pointed out in an earlier article arising out
of the previous Institute for Investor Protection’s Conference:
[C]hannel stuffing is a form of Ponzi scheme: you rob sales from [Q2]
to enhance [Q1]; then it becomes necessary to rob sales from [Q3] to
enhance Q2. But the channel stuffing diversion in Q3 may likely
exceed Q2 because then Q3 diversion needs not only to replace what
was “robbed” in Q2 but also to enhance Q2.80

The court in In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Securities Litigation81 found
that a sixty-one day period between stock sales by an executive and an
announcement that sales would fall “woefully short of previous
estimates”82 was not suspicious because of the “temporal distance”83
75. Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 668.
76. Id. at 664 n.8.
77. Id. at 668.
78. Id.
79. Id. (“The statements made on 22 February 2000 and 23 February 2000 reported
Crossroads’s financial results for the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2000 and detailed analysts
earnings estimates for the fiscal second quarter. The 27 July 2000 statement states only that
‘revenues for the [third] quarter may be as much as two-thirds below revenues for the prior
quarter.’ The release does not report any concern that Crossroads’s first and second quarter
earnings may be incorrect. Moreover, the 27 July 2000 release makes no reference at all to
Crossroads’s first and second fiscal quarters. Because there is no relationship between the
statement made on 27 July 2000 and those made on 22 February 2000 and 23 February 2000,
Crossroads’s statements on these days cannot form the basis for a fraud-on-the-market claim.”
(citations omitted)).
80. Charles W. Murdock, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Particularity: Why
Are Some Courts in an Alternate Universe?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 615, 629 (2014).
81. In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
82. Id. at 1316–17.
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between the sales and the announcement. Here again, the court did not
understand the nature of channel stuffing and revenue manipulation:
This focus upon two months (sixty-one days) being significant, but
sixty-nine days (May 20 to July 28) not being significant, is another
example of living in an alternate universe. Channel stuffing often
involves bringing sales back from a subsequent quarter into a prior
quarter. By definition, the fraud will not be disclosed for ninety days,
plus the period from the end of the subsequent quarter until disclosure
is made. Thus, 100 days or more may expire between the time of the
wrongful activity and the indirect announcement of its existence by
virtue of lower revenues in the following quarter. If the channel
stuffing extends over more than one quarter, the time span between
commencement of the channel stuffing and the subsequent reduced
revenues will be even longer.84

Were the channel stuffing to extend over two quarters, it could be
190 days or more before there would be any information provided to the
market with respect to the fraud perpetrated months earlier.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Greenberg and Flowserve,
the price impact of an announcement made with respect to a drop in
revenues in the third quarter very likely could be related to fraudulent
misstatements of earnings in the first two quarters.
The Fifth Circuit also opined that the corrective disclosure must be
more pointed than simply indicating that “the market understood that
there was some problem with Flowserve’s business.”85 A “general
impression in the market that ‘something is wrong’ is insufficient to
establish causation.”86 This statement by the court again reflects a lack
of understanding of how markets work and also illustrates how corruptbut-clever management can escape liability under the present regime of
federal court jurisprudence.
Assume that the first- and second-quarter financial results discussed
above were fraudulent, i.e., the company had fabricated revenues
(whether by channel stuffing or other illicit means) in order to increase
earnings and maintain the price of the company’s stock. What the
company should do, and did in Greenberg and Flowserve, is
83. Id. at 1317.
84. Murdock, supra note 80, at 631.
85. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“Clearly, the market understood that there was some problem with Flowserve’s business (or its
business environment) when the company reduced earnings guidance and the market reacted by
driving down Flowserve’s share price. But loss caused solely by a general impression in the
market that ‘something is wrong’ is insufficient to establish causation.”)
86. Id.
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dramatically reduce its earnings or revenue guidance for the third
quarter. What the market cares about is continued growth. Growth is a
major factor in determining the stock price set by the market. If growth
is to stop, or more significantly, plummet, this will have a dramatic
downward impact on the price of a company’s stock.87
While the market is not indifferent as to the reason why revenues are
plunging, when it looks like growth has evaporated, there will be a race
to get out and the market price will drop sharply. The reality is that
once “the market underst[ands] that there [i]s some problem with
Flowserve’s business,”88 the price of its stock will drop. Thus, corruptbut-clever management will send a signal that there is something wrong
with the company’s existing business plan, e.g., that acquisitions are not
panning out as anticipated. This, in turn, will cause the price of the
stock to drop. Then it will be safe for management to identify the real
problem with the company’s existing business plan, namely, that it was
inflating revenues and/or earnings by channel-stuffing. But, when
management discloses the actual fraud, the price of the stock will not
drop because the market has already impounded a failing business plan
into the price of the stock.
What courts need to understand is that it is possible to “manipulate”
the price of the stock down without identifying the fraud that makes the
company’s stock overpriced. In the foregoing example, it was the
prospect of reduced revenues from the forward-looking disclosure of
poor acquisitions that led to the drop in price. But what really caused
the reduced revenues, and drop in market price was that the channelstuffing caught up to the company when it could no longer fabricate
sales.
The lack of demand for its product was known to management in
quarters one and two when it hid this lack of demand by inflating

87. See Murdock, supra note 7, at 214 n.76:
When stock sells at a high price/earnings ratio, the value of the stock is heavily
dependent upon the anticipated growth rate.
CR = DR – G.
Therefore, the larger the growth rate, the lower the capitalization rate. The
capitalization rate is inversely proportional to the price-earnings multiple. Thus, the
larger the growth rate, the higher the price-earnings multiple. Since a rudimentary
approach to the value of a company is earnings times the price-earnings multiple, a
decrease in earnings [and, consequently, growth] is a double whammy: it reduces the
earnings, and the reduced earnings lower growth and thereby increase the capitalization
rate, consequently reducing the price-earnings ratio.
88. Alaska, 572 F.3d at 232.
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revenues in these two quarters.89 Consequently, investors who bought
the stock in quarters one and two at a price that was inflated because it
impounded the existing expectations of the company’s product,
revenues, and growth, paid a price that was higher than the price should
have been had the actual facts been disclosed. As a result, the investors
were injured by the false information inserted into the market by the
company in quarters one and two and should be entitled to recover the
difference between what they paid and what the stock was actually
worth at the time of their purchase. Normally, the drop in price after the
corrective disclosure is a good surrogate for what the price would have
been had the truth been told in quarters one and two, assuming that
there were no external factors which caused a general decline in stock
prices. But, in the illustration I have used, the market price was pushed
downward by the company’s disclosure of other factors, casting doubt
on the profitability of the company’s existing business plan. Thus, the
price after disclosure of the channel-stuffing is not an appropriate
measure of loss causation.
The second group of misleading statements in Flowserve related to
the October 2001 earnings guidance that was reduced about 60% in
subsequent earnings guidance issued in July and September 2002.90 In
this regard, the Fifth Circuit held that the corrective earnings guidance,
and the correlative price decline, could have related to fraudulent
earnings guidance in October 2001.91 But this is probably a short-lived
victory for plaintiffs. With regard to this aspect of the case, the
defendants argued that “any forward-looking statements they issued are
protected by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe-harbor
provision.”92 The Fifth Circuit temporarily rejected this argument on
the basis that it implicated disputed factual issues that should be
addressed by the district court.93
However, on remand, the plaintiffs will be confronted with the
Reform Act’s safe-harbor provision which provides that a person is not
liable with respect to a forward-looking statement to the extent that:
89. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 591–93 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated and remanded to Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007)
(illustrating that the CEO made a series of positive and specific statements that one key products,
the Titan 5500 was experiencing continued growth and that a newer product, the Titan 6500, was
ready to ship. Contrariwise, demand for the 5500 was precipitously declining and the 6500 was
not yet being produced).
90. Alaska, 572 F.3d at 226.
91. Id. at 231–32.
92. Id. at 235.
93. Id.
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(A) The forward-looking statement is—
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) The plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement—

...
(ii) if made by a business entity; was—
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of
that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge
by that officer that the statement was false or
misleading.94

The “or” in the above safe harbor is a critical word. Even if
management knows that the material in the forward-looking statement is
false, there is no liability if the statement is identified as forwardlooking and is accompanied by cautionary statements. In Harris v. Ivax
Corp.,95 the court determined that the safe-harbor provisions require the
court first to examine whether the statement was accompanied by
cautionary language. If so, the state of mind of the person making the
statement is irrelevant:
All of the statements that the plaintiffs claim to be false or misleading
are forward-looking.
They were accompanied, moreover, by
“meaningful cautionary language.” Because we reach this conclusion,
we need not in this case enter the thicket of the PSLRA’s new
pleading requirements for scienter; if a statement is accompanied by
“meaningful cautionary language,” the defendants’ state of mind is
irrelevant.96

It will be rare that a forward-looking statement is made without being so

94. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
95. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1999).
96. Id.; see H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743
(“The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the cautionary statement
accompanying the forward-looking statement. Courts should not examine the state of mind of the
person making the statement.”). In a footnote, the court added:
The plaintiffs do make a wholly unpersuasive argument that the defendants’
knowledge of the need to reduce goodwill robs the projections of their forward-looking
status. The statutory definition of “forward-looking statement” does not refer at all to
the defendants’ knowledge of the truth or falsity of the statement, however; such
knowledge is relevant only to liability in the safe harbor, and even there only when
there is inadequate cautionary language.
Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 n.10.
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identified and without being accompanied by cautionary statements.
This illustrates another ploy that corrupt-but-clever management can
utilize to avoid liability. If management has made both misleading
factual statements and misleading forward-looking statements that
nonetheless had cautionary language, then management would provide a
corrective disclosure with respect to the misleading forward-looking
statements with the expectation that such acknowledgment would drive
the price of the stock down. It would then issue a corrective statement
with respect to the factual statements it had made and the price impact
of the second corrective statement could then be minimal. Attempting
to sort out how much price movement is caused by each of several
misleading statements is somewhat akin to determining how many
angels can dance on the head of a pin.
The Fifth Circuit in Flowserve well summarized the plight of a
securities litigation class-action plaintiff: such person “must thread the
eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial
decree and congressional action.”97
IV. THE IMPACT OF HALLIBURTON II ON SUBSEQUENT CASES
While, at the time this Article was written near the end of 2014, there
were about two-dozen cases citing Halliburton II, most of them were
only general citations. However, four of those cases contained
extensive discussion of Halliburton II’s directive to permit defendant to
establish a lack of price impact to defeat certification. These cases have
generally been favorable to plaintiffs.
In the Eighth Circuit, the district court in IBEW Local 98 Pension
Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc.,98 rejected several arguments by the
defendants opposing certification. The argument relevant to this Article
was the assertion that the following two supposedly misleading
statements on September 14, 2010 by Best Buy’s management during
an earnings conference call had no price impact: “Best Buy was ‘on
track to deliver and exceed [the] annual [earnings per share (“‘EPS’”)]
guidance’; and (2) that Best Buy’s earnings ‘are essentially in line with
[Best Buy’s] original expectations for the year.’”99
Best Buy generally traded in the $40s during the period in

97. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009).
98. IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., No. 11-429, 2014 WL 4746195, at *9 (D.
Minn. Aug. 6, 2014).
99. Id. at *1 (alteration in original).
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question.100 Prior to the conference call and before the opening of the
market, Best Buy issued a press release acknowledging a 0.1% decline
in comparable store sales growth, lower revenue expectations and some
other negative information.101 However, it also announced a $.20
increase in earnings per share guidance to a range of $3.55–$3.70 per
share.102
The court treated the above two statements as factual, not forwardlooking, and the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were aware of
multiple significant facts that Best Buy was not on track to achieve the
fiscal targets for 2011.103 In December, 2010, Best Buy made a
corrective statement: “[O]n December 14, 2010, the Company reported
3Q11 EPS of $0.54, falling short of 3Q11 estimates. The Company also
reported a decline in comparable store sales of 5%, and a decline in
market share of 110 basis points. At that time, Defendants reduced
FY11 EPS guidance to $3.20–$3.40.”104
Best Buy’s stock price declined from $41.70 to $35.52, a 14%
decline.105
The defendants had not challenged market efficiency with respect to
Best Buy stock; their argument with respect to lack of price impact was
focused upon the event study of the plaintiff’s expert comparing the
price at market close on September 13 with the closing price on
September 14, when there was intervening, non-actionable information
before the market opened on September 14 (the press release) that
occurred before they supposedly made the misleading statements in the
conference call. On the other hand, the event study of the expert
witness for the defendants showed no price impact for the misleading
statements.
The court, referring to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Schleicher v.
Wendt that, “when an unduly optimistic statement stops a price from
declining . . . once the truth comes out, the price drops to where it would
have been had the statement not been made,”106 responded:
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that
Best Buy’s stock price rose after the alleged misstatements and later
declined after Best Buy revealed information on December 14, 2010.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at *1 n.3, *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *1 n.2, *2.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
Id.
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Thus, Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that the alleged
misrepresentations affected the market price of Best Buy stock, and
the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the presumption of
reliance.107

More particularly, in concluding that the defendant’s evidence did not
rebut the presumption of reliance, the court stated:
[T]he Court concludes that Defendants have not submitted evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. The fact that nonactionable statements made in the press release may have caused
initial upward movement in Best Buy’s stock price does not
necessarily mean that misrepresentations made during the earnings
conference call that occurred shortly thereafter did not also impact the
stock price. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that the stock price rose generally
(if not in a straight line) throughout the class period, and then fell
sharply after Best Buy revealed its true financial condition on
December 13, 2010. (Even though the stock price may have been
inflated prior to the earnings phone conference, the alleged
misrepresentations could have further inflated the price, prolonged the
inflation of the price, or slowed the rate of fall. This impact on the
stock price can support a securities fraud claim.108

Because the defendants “ha[d] not offered evidence to show that Best
Buy’s stock price did not decrease when the truth was revealed,” the
court concluded “that Defendants ha[d] not submitted evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”109
The Eleventh Circuit’s proposition in FindWhat that securities
liability can be premised upon “fraudulent misstatements that prolong
[price] inflation,” which was relied upon in Best Buy, predated
Halliburton II but was again followed after Halliburton II in Local 703,
I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Employees Welfare Fund v. Regions
Financial Corp.110 This was the first court of appeals decision to deal
107. Best Buy, 2014 WL 4746195, at *6.
108. Id. at *6 (internal citation omitted) (citing FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658
F.3d 1282, 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011)) (“[I]t is irrelevant to securities fraud liability that the
stock price was already inflated before a defendant’s first actionable misrepresentation; fraudulent
misstatements that prolong inflation can be just as harmful . . .”); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936
F. Supp. 2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[A] misstatement may cause inflation simply by
maintaining existing market expectations” (citation omitted)); see Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 683–84
(explaining that a public misrepresentation may impact the stock price by causing the price to rise
or stopping it from declining). “Moreover, price impact can be shown by a decrease in price
following a revelation of the fraud.” Best Buy, 2014 WL 4746195, at *6 (citing Schleicher, 618
F.3d at 683–84).
109. Best Buy, 2014 WL 4746195 at *6.
110. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762
F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014); FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1317; Best Buy, 2014 WL 4746195, at
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extensively with price impact after Halliburton II. The court, in dealing
with price impact, looked at both the price rise accruing after the
misrepresentation and the price drop occurring after the corrective
statement. The case dealt with a situation in which the price was
steadily dropping, a situation considered by the Seventh Circuit in the
Schleicher case.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Regions Financial, first considered market
efficiency and rejected the defendant’s argument that the district court
certification was deficient because the lower court did not follow
Cammer v. Bloom.111 The circuit court responded that the Eleventh
Circuit had not adopted any mandatory test but had identified “some
major, general characteristics”: “the market for a stock is generally
efficient when ‘millions of shares change hands daily’” and there exists
“‘a critical mass’ of investors and/or analysts who ‘study the available
information and influence the stock price through trades and
recommendations.’”112 In so doing, the court was not precluding the
use of the Cammer factors, but merely rejecting them as a mandatory
framework.
The court also recognized:
However, even these general signs of an efficient market may not be
required for a finding of an efficient market in every case. Stocks that
trade on a smaller scale, or that are not widely followed, might trade
on an efficient market. It is up to the District Courts to consider the
nature of the market on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the
totality of the circumstances supports a finding of market
efficiency.113

This is in line with Halliburton II’s recognition that the fraud-on-themarket presumption is based “on the fairly modest premise that ‘market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices,’”114
and that Basic did not adopt “‘any particular theory of how quickly and
completely publicly available information is reflected in market
price.’”115
With respect to Regions Financial’s argument that it was always
*6.
111. Regions Fin. Grp., 762 F.3d at 1255; see Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87
(D.N.J. 1989) (providing several factors to analyze market efficiency).
112. Regions Fin. Grp., 762 F.3d at 1254–55 (quoting FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1310).
113. Id. at 1255.
114. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct.
2398, 2410 (2014).
115. Id. at 2410 (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.28 (1988)).
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necessary to require proof that the alleged misrepresentations had an
immediate effect on the stock price, the Eleventh Circuit observed that
the misleading statements were “confirmatory” statements that would
not necessarily impact the price of the stock:
Confirmatory misrepresentations “confirm” existing information about
a stock, rather than release new and different information that might
bring about a negative change in the stock’s price. In other words,
Regions’s disclosures were designed to prevent a more precipitous
decline in the stock’s price, not bring about any change to it. When a
company releases expected information, truthful or otherwise, the
efficient market hypothesis underlying Basic predicts that the
disclosure will cause no significant change in the price.116

In so doing, the circuit court referred to FindWhat: “A corollary of
the efficient market hypothesis is that disclosure of confirmatory
information—or information already known by the market—will not
cause a change in the stock price. This is so because the market has
already digested that information and incorporated it into the price.”117
The court also noted that: “[A] confirmatory misrepresentation is like
an omission, because it is an affirmative representation that omits
negative information. Thus, like we do here, the District Court noted
that this type of misrepresentation would likely yield price stability
rather than volatility, just as we would expect with a traditional
omission.”118
The Eleventh Circuit found the necessary price impact for the
plaintiffs’ to meet their initial burden under Basic in the market reaction
to the corrective disclosure:
The plaintiffs in this case did identify one unexpected disclosure
around the class period—a corrective disclosure on January 20, 2009,
which had an immediate negative impact on the stock price. On this
record, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it refused
to require the plaintiffs to identify more instances of unexpected
disclosures and a resulting price impact before finding the initial
burden under Basic satisfied.119

However, according to the Eleventh Circuit, while Regions Financial
presented evidence on price impact, the district court did not fully
consider such evidence and, in light of Halliburton II, the case was

116.
117.
118.
119.

Regions Fin. Grp., 762 F.3d at 1256 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1310).
Id. at 1256 n.5.
Id. at 1257.
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remanded for reconsideration.120 In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit
signaled that price impact need not be found both at the time of the
misrepresentation and upon the corrective disclosure: “Halliburton II by
no means holds that in every case in which such evidence is presented,
the presumption will always be defeated. Indeed, this Court has
recognized the distinct role that confirmatory information may have in
this analysis.”121
Upon remand, the district court both considered whether or not there
was price impact and also summarily disposed of defendants’ arguments
with respect to materiality and loss causation, issues which the Supreme
Court has held are reserved for the trial on the merits.122 With respect
to the defendants’ argument that “none of the misrepresentations were
material because the marked [sic] price never reflected the
misrepresentations,”123 the court responded: “Defendants mix price
impact and loss causation. Proof of the cause of plaintiff’s losses as a
result of the defendants’ misrepresentations is not before the court at
this time. Such a discussion is in the realm of ‘“loss causation’” and
reserved for a trial on the merits.”124 With respect to materiality,
defendants also argued:
[N]one of the misrepresentations identified by the plaintiffs were, in
fact, material, because the market was already aware that the
statements were false.
Additionally, defendants claimed that
misrepresentations from April 2008 through January 2009 were
immaterial, because the market was aware the loan loss reserves were
going to increase.125

This argument is akin to the “truth-on-the-market” defense, which the
district court, relying upon Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical
Partners,126 rejected.

120. Id. at 1258–59.
121. Id. at 1259. The court cited FindWhat, noting that “A corollary of the efficient market
hypothesis is that disclosure of confirmatory information—or information already known by the
market—will not cause a change in the stock price. This is so because the market has already
digested that information and incorporated it into the price.” Id. (citing FindWhat, 658 F.3d at
1310).
122. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013)
(noting that proof of materiality of alleged misrepresentations are not a prerequisite to a class);
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (holding that
plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification).
123. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No.
CV–10–J–2847–S, 2014 WL 6661918, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2014).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *7.
126. Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners, 302 F.R.D. 657, 670–72 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
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Turning to price impact, the focus of the district court was upon the
price impact of the corrective disclosure. With respect to the lack of
price impact from the fraudulent confirmatory disclosures, the court
stated that “[c]learly, representing Regions had assets that did not
actually exist could keep the value of its stock trading at artificially high
level.”127
With respect to the corrective announcement on January 20, 2009
that the company had suffered a $5.6 billion loss for the fourth quarter
of 2008 (driven by the net loss of $6 billion charge for the impairment
of goodwill), the defendants acknowledged that Regions Financial stock
“fell to $4.60, a drop of $1.40,”128 or about 24.2%. But the defendants
explained this drop as follows: “Defendants’ expert asserts that the
January 20, 2009, price tumble was based on external market factors,
citing to evidence that on the same date, January 20, 2009, Wells Fargo
stock fell 23.89 percent, BB & T stock fell 11.09 percent, and
Huntington Bancshares fell 16.45 percent.”129
The district court did not find this persuasive:
Yet those same evidentiary submissions noted such reports from
industry analysts as that, on January 21, 2009, “Regions took a
goodwill impairment in 4Q08, driving a high GAAP loss per share of
$9.01. The goodwill impairment accounted for $8.66 of the loss.”
This, of course, is evidence of price impact.130

In addition, the defendants’ event study “also noted that the New
York Stock Exchange index declined only 6.11 percent that same
day.”131 This served to rebut the defendants’ argument that the decline
in Regions’ stock was due to “across-the-board investor panic.”132
Consequently, the defendants failed to establish a lack of price
impact. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that, “because
plaintiffs’ expert conducted no event study of his own, plaintiffs
necessarily cannot survive the analysis after Halliburton II.”133 Factors
that appear to militate against defendants were that the NYSE index
dropped only 6.1% on the day that Regions Financial stock dropped
24% and that one analyst focused upon the goodwill impairment in his

127. Regions Fin. Grp., 2014 WL 6661918, at *7 (“Using misrepresentations to maintain a
stock price is no less of a fraud than the use of the same to artificially increase the price.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (internal citation omitted).
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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report. On the other hand, another financial institution, Wells Fargo,
also fell about 24%. However, from the opinion, we do not know
whether comparable negative information was also made available to
the market about Wells Fargo. In addition, the disclosure of overstated
assets and inadequate reserves by one financial institution may have
indicated to the market that other financial institutions had similar
problems.
In determining that the defendants had not established a lack of
market impact, the district court was quite clear that it saw its role as not
conducting an extensive mini-trial on this issue:
Regardless of other events occurring the day in question, defendants
concede its stock tumbled 24% on January 24, 2009. Whether this
tumble was due to defendants’ corrective disclosures, namely that
good will was significantly more impaired than previously asserted
and that the loan loss reserves where drastically understated, or due to
the overall market conditions on that day, is an ultimate question in
this action, and properly reserved for a jury to decide. Similarly,
whether this tumble was the continuation of the steady decline in stock
price from February 2008 through the end of the class period, due to
external market factors, or whether it was directly attributable to the
January 20, 2009, corrective disclosure is a question of fact, so tied to
the merits of this case that it is reserved for the trier of fact.134

This approach by the district court avoided raising the Seventh
Amendment issue that could occur when a district court decides
disputed evidentiary issues at a mini-trial at certification, thereby
depriving plaintiff of a jury trial on such disputed facts.135
The fourth case, Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical Partners,136
applied a rigorous standard in evaluating whether defendants had
established the absence of price impact. There, the defendants issued a
press release on August 27, 2013 stating that “a Catalyst drug named
Firdapse, which treats Lambert–Eaton Myasthenic Syndrome
(“LEMS”), had been designated by the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) as a Breakthrough Therapy and that there was no effective and
available treatment for LEMS.”137 After the release, the price of

134. Id.
135. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323
(2010) (arguing against the federal courts trend requiring “plaintiffs to prove essential elements of
their securities fraud claims at the preliminary class certification stage”).
136. Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners, 304 F.R.D. 657, 670–72 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
137. Id. at 662.
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Catalyst common stock increased 42%, from $1.42 to $2.01.138
Two and one-half months later, on October 18, 2013, an article was
published that reported “Amifampridine (“3,4–DAP”) was an effective
treatment for LEMS, had been available for years and was nearly
identical to Firdapse.”139
Moreover, the article reported that
Amifampridine was offered to LEMS patients free of charge.140 The
price of Catalyst common stock dropped from $2.61 to $1.90 on
October 18, and then to $1.52 the following day.141 This was a 42%
decrease in the price of Catalyst stock.
According to the district court in Catalyst, “once a plaintiff shows
entitlement to a presumption of reliance, the defendant is burdened with
the daunting task of proving that the publicly known statement had no
price impact.”142 As the following analysis of the court’s examination
of the defendants’ arguments will demonstrate, the defendants’ task is
indeed “daunting.”
The defendants sought to explain the 42% increase in the price on the
basis that other information in the release, namely the designation as a
“breakthrough therapy,” was the factor that drove the price increase.143
This was certainly a significant factor since it would provide expedited
development and review of the drug. In addition:
According to Defendants, the relative importance of Firdapse’s
Breakthrough Therapy status is buttressed by the fact that: (1) both
financial analyst reports issued following the press release focused on
Firdapse’s Breakthrough Therapy status and both ignored the alleged
misrepresentation; (2) one financial analyst raised its target price for
Catalyst common stock following the press release and explicitly
credited this change to Firdapse’s being designated as a Breakthrough
Therapy; and (3) articles published in news outlets following the press
release focused on Firdapse’s Breakthrough Therapy status.144

However, the district court determined that the foregoing did not
establish a lack of price impact: “But even assuming arguendo that the
announcement of Firdapse’s Breakthrough Therapy designation was

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 673 (“[T]he Court recognizes that it is incumbent upon the defendant to show the
absence of price impact. The Court’s judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on
securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.” (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) (Ginsburg J., concurring))).
143. Id. at 669.
144. Id. at 672.
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substantially more important than the alleged misrepresentation that
there existed no effective and available treatment for LEMS, it does not
follow that the misrepresentation did not account for any of the 42%
spike in stock price.”145
The district court then considered the defendants’ arguments that the
“corrective” disclosure that there was an alternative treatment for LEMS
did not account for the 42% price drop. According to the defendants,
“bad publicity and market overreaction from the October 18, 2013,
article fully accounted for the 42% decline in stock price.”146 The court
determined that this argument also failed:
While the article painted Catalyst as a villain for its plan to charge for
Firdapse notwithstanding that LEMS patients had effectively been
receiving the drug free of charge, and while bad press and market
overreaction may have affected Catalyst’s stock price, it does not
follow that the revelation of 3,4–DAP as an effective and available
alternative to Firdapse did not also contribute to the 42% fall in stock
price.147

According to the court, showing that one factor may have contributed to
the price drop did not mean that another factor did not also contribute:
Thus, notwithstanding that the commentary following the article
focused on Catalyst’s greed, and notwithstanding that the article did
not cause any analysts to lower their target price of Catalyst stock,
Defendants have not shown that the revelation of 3,4–DAP as an
effective and available alternative to Firdapse had no negative impact
on the price of Catalyst stock.148

The court supported its conclusion that market overreaction was not
the sole cause of the price drop by noting that the “the price of Catalyst
stock did not recover in the days or months following the publication of
the article.”149
The defendants also offered expert testimony that “the increase in
Catalyst’s market capitalization immediately following the press release
is ‘fully consistent’ with the rise in market capitalization of the twentytwo other companies that have announced Breakthrough Therapy
designation.”150 The court questioned the relevance of this analysis as
it related to whether the alleged misrepresentation had a price impact

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672 n.5.
Id.
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and, more significantly, stated that demonstrating “that an absence of
price impact is consistent with their analysis [wa]s insufficient.”151
Because Defendants have the burden of showing an absence of price
impact, they must show that price impact [regarding the alleged
fraudulent statement] is inconsistent with the results of their analysis.
[Consequently] Defendants fail[ed] to show that the alleged
misrepresentation did not at all contribute to the 42% spike in the
price of Catalyst common stock on August 27, 2013.152

The district court placed a further burden upon defendants:
[A]ssuming arguendo that Defendants had shown the August 27,
2013, price spike to be wholly caused by the truthful announcement of
Firdapse’s Breakthrough Therapy designation, it is still possible that
the alleged misrepresentation offset some unexpected event or
information that would have negated to some extent the market effect
of Breakthrough Therapy status. [Defendants did not] even attempt to
show that there were no unexpected events negatively affecting
Catalyst’s stock price on August 27, 2013. And by failing to show an
absence of these other factors, which might have been offset by the
alleged misrepresentation, Defendants fail to show an absence of price
impact.153

The foregoing analysis by the district court supports Justice
Ginsburg’s conclusion in her concurring opinion that Halliburton II
“should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable
claims.”154
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing cases and analyses, the following conclusions can
be drawn:
First, litigating a general proposition as to whether a particular
company’s stock traded in an efficient market involves futility and
irrelevancy, as well as undue cost and waste of judicial resources. What
is relevant is the specific issue of whether a misrepresentation involved
price distortion.
Second, where the misleading statements are confirmatory, price
distortion is established not by price movement at the time of the
misrepresentation, but rather when the corrective disclosure is made.

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 672–73 (citations omitted).
154. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct.
2398, 2417 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Third, if a defendant seeks to defeat certification by showing a lack
of price impact, the defendant must negate any price impact from the
misrepresentation. Otherwise, the district court is summarily making a
determination of a disputed factual issue, thus interfering with the
plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to have a jury trial on the merits.
Fourth, if a court does conduct an evidentiary mini-trial on price
impact, the court must permit extensive discovery and opportunity for
plaintiff to rebut the lack of price impact. Consequently, the
determination by the court on this issue should either be the law of the
case or should have issue preclusion effect.
Fifth, under the circumstances in the preceding fourth paragraph, the
Seventh Amendment right of the plaintiff to a jury trial is clearly
violated. The determination of a lack of price impact is dispositive of
the case and involves a disputed factual determination outside the trial
on the merits.
Consequently, certification should not resolve contested issues of fact
but should be solely procedural in nature. The most sound way to
accomplish this would be to recognize that what the market, and
investors in the market, rely upon is a total mix of information in the
market, that price is derived from that information, and that, by
corporate management inserting misleading information into the
market, they have provided a normative basis for reliance by investors
generally. Certification should be a summary procedure and disputed
factual issues—such as materiality, loss causation, and price impact—
should be resolved at a trial on the merits. Judicial time and expense
should not be wasted on trying to determine the concept of market
efficiency, a matter upon which economists do not even agree.

